Internal Rent Seeking, Works Councils, and Optimal Establishment Size by Beckmann, Michael & Kräkel, Matthias
 
 
 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Zentrum (WWZ) der Universität Basel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Rent Seeking, Works Councils,  
and Optimal Establishment Size 
 
 
 
WWZ Discussion Paper 2011/14 Michael Beckmann, Matthias Kräkel 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Authors: 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Michael Beckmann  
Department of Human Resources and Organization (WWZ), University of Basel 
Peter Merian-Weg 6 
CH - 4002 Basel 
Phone: +41 61 267 32 24 
michael.beckmann@unibas.ch 
 
 
Prof. Dr. Matthias Kräkel  
Department of Personnel and Organizational Economics, University of Bonn 
Adenauerallee 24 - 42 
D-53113 Bonn 
Phone: +49 228 73 39 14 
m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A publication of the Center of Business and Economics (WWZ), University of Basel.  
 
 The author(s). Reproduction for other purposes than the personal use needs the permission of the 
author(s). 
 
 
Internal Rent Seeking, Works Councils, and
Optimal Establishment Size∗
Michael Beckmann† Matthias Kra¨kel‡
Abstract
Using a microeconomic model and data from the Establishment Panel
of the German Institute for Employment Research, we analyze the optimal
establishment size against the background of rent-seeking workers and the
influence of works councils. The theoretical part shows that establishment
size has a discouragement effect on the level of individual rent seeking but
also a quantity effect as the number of rent seekers increases. The interplay
of both effects – together with technological considerations – determines
whether the employer chooses an inefficiently small or large establishment
size. Introduction of a works council restores efficient establishment size
although it is purely used as rent-seeking device. Whether the employer
benefits from a works council or not, depends on the degree of contract
incompleteness and the degree of worker coordination via a works council.
The empirical part indicates dominance of the discouragement effect over
the quantity effect in establishments without works council. As theoretically
predicted, works councils are beneficial by disentangling rent-seeking and
production issues, thus eliminating the influence of the two rent-seeking
effects.
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1 Introduction
The effort exerted by organization members to maximize their expected utility may
often not only be productive but also counterproductive. Such behavior typically
aims at redistributing organizational rents and can therefore be labeled internal
rent seeking (e.g., Gibbons 2005). The problem of internal rent seeking arises
from the fact that contractual relationships are usually incomplete (Masten 1986,
Konrad 2002), which particularly holds for labor contracts (Simon 1951). This
incompleteness leaves room for politicking and influence activities that cannot be
prevented by law or formal contracts. Internal rent seeking does not only occur
among the workers of an establishment but also between workforce and employer.
As has been emphasized by Freeman and Lazear (1995), the workforce strictly
benefits from a works council when competing for rents with the employer.
The aim of our paper is twofold. First, we theoretically analyze the employer’s
optimal choice of establishment size when workers invest in rent seeking and pos-
sibly install a works council. The analysis proceeds in two steps. In a first step,
optimal establishment size is derived in a situation where workers cannot rely on
a works council when competing with their employer for internal rents. In this
benchmark case, one might presume that the employer is interested to limit the
rent-seeking problem by reducing establishment size and, hence, the number of
internal rent seekers (Holmstro¨m and Roberts 1998, p. 77). This aspect will be
referred to as the quantity effect. However, there also exists a discouragement ef-
fect for rent seekers if the number of opponents becomes large, because individual
rent seeking has a lower relative weight. In practice, moreover, the employer does
not determine establishment size solely to control rent-seeking behavior. He will
also be concerned with technological issues when choosing the optimal number of
workers. The smaller the degree of contractual incompleteness, the more emphasis
the employer will put on production technology. We discuss how these three effects
interact and influence the employer’s choice of establishment size.
In a second step, we introduce a works council into the game, which is a body
installed by the workforce of an establishment.1 A works council – loosely compa-
1See Addison (2009) for a comprehensive survey.
2
rable to a local union2 – serves as an institutional voice for the workers (Hirschman
1970), thus improving the establishment’s suggestion system and saving bargaining
costs by replacing individual bargaining by collective bargaining. However, this
instrument can also be used by the workforce as a pure rent-seeking device (e.g.,
Freeman and Lazear 1995). Works councils are quite common, particularly in the
countries of the European Union, where some national labor laws even stipulate
mandatory councils (e.g., the Works Constitution Act [Betriebsverfassungsgesetz]
in Germany).3 Installing a works council allows the workers to coordinate individ-
ual behavior. This coordination enables the workforce to act as a single collective
player against the employer in the internal rent-seeking contest and, hence, pre-
vents workers from competing against each other. The impact of a works council
on overall rent seeking is analyzed, referring again to the quantity and the discour-
agement effects.
The second aim of our paper is to empirically test the relevance both of the
discouragement and the quantity effects for overall rent seeking and the impact
of a works council on these two effects. Using data from an establishment-level
survey, we investigate these two rent-seeking effects both of which correspond to
establishment size. From a theoretical viewpoint the impact of establishment size
on overall rent seeking is ambiguous: according to the quantity effect, rent seeking
should be increasing in establishment size, whereas dominance of the discourage-
ment effect should lead to a negative relationship. Hence, the crucial question as
to which effect is more relevant in practice can only be answered empirically.
However, the theoretical model yields a clear-cut prediction concerning the
influence of a works council on the two rent-seeking effects. Since a works council
acts on the authority of the complete workforce, the number of workers is no longer
decisive for rent seeking. A works council thus eliminates the discouragement and
quantity effects so that we do not expect a significant effect of establishment size
on the intensity of overall rent seeking. Note that this general result regarding
the disentangling of rent-seeking and production issues by the introduction of a
2Of course, there are also institutional differences between works councils and local unions.
For example, works councils are typically not allowed to organize a strike of the workforce and
do not directly bargain over wages.
3For an overview, see Rogers and Streeck (1995).
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collective representative of the workers also applies to local unions.
The findings of our econometric model show that the discouragement effect is
highly relevant for rent seeking in establishments without a works council. Estab-
lishment size has a significantly negative effect on overall rent-seeking intensity,
thus indicating that individual rent seekers are discouraged if the number of co-
workers increases. The results also indicate that works councils tend to intensify
the workers’ rent-seeking activities by eliminating the discouragement effect. Our
empirical findings support the theoretical model: whereas the discouragement ef-
fect has a significant influence on establishments without a works council, neither
rent-seeking effect has a significant influence on establishments with a works coun-
cil.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section gives an overview of the
related literature. Section 3 introduces the basic theoretical model. Section 4
addresses the relationship between internal rent seeking and optimal establish-
ment size without a works council. In Section 5, we introduce a works council
in our game and analyze the implications for optimal establishment size, the em-
ployer’s rent-seeking expenditures, and establishment profits. Section 6 contains
our econometric analysis. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to two fields of the economic literature – the discussion of
works councils and the work on internal rent-seeking contests. There exists one
seminal theory article in the field of works councils, namely the paper by Freeman
and Lazear (1995).4 For this reason, our paper makes an attempt to fill the theory
gap in the research on works councils. The economic analysis of Freeman and
Lazear (1995) points out that mandated works councils can be welfare improving.
Given a rent-seeking scenario between employer and workforce, the employer would
choose an inefficiently small degree of employee involvement, while the workforce
would choose an inefficiently large degree of employee involvement in order to
increase its power when competing with the employer for internal rents. Therefore,
4See also Addison (2009), pp. 33-35, on the Freeman-Lazear approach.
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a mandated works council with a moderate degree of employee involvement can
be a better solution from society’s point of view. Moreover, Freeman and Lazear
show that better communication via a works council can also increase welfare.
Our paper is related to the first part of Freeman and Lazear (1995) on works
councils as a rent-seeking instrument. In contrast to Freeman and Lazear (1995),
we use a contest model to analyze the game between the employer and the workers
with and without a works council to compare both outcomes. Moreover, we focus
on establishment size, which influences establishment performance because of the
technological issues and rent-seeking effects involved.
Many empirical papers on works councils investigate, whether welfare and es-
tablishment performance (e.g., profits, labor turnover, productivity, innovations)
are positively or negatively related to the existence of a works council.5 Addison
et al. (2000) directly test the Freeman-Lazear approach, using data from Britain
(where works councils are not mandated) and Germany (with mandatory works
councils). They find that the data offer empirical support for the key results of the
Freeman-Lazear model. But altogether, the empirical studies offer mixed results.
For example, Fitzroy and Kraft (1987) find that works councils are negatively as-
sociated with establishment productivity. However, other studies observe positive
or at least no negative productivity effects of works councils (e.g., Addison et al.
2006, Mueller 2009). In our model, we address the reversed question of how pro-
ductivity affects the behavior of a works council. We show that higher productivity
leads to a larger rent and, thus, to more intense rent seeking by the works council.
Since both employer and workers invest in labor relationships and generate
quasi-rents, a works council may not only engage in rent seeking to hold-up the
employer (in cases where the employer is the investor) but also in rent protection (in
cases where workers are the investing party). Whereas the findings of Beckmann
et al. (2010) support the rent-seeking hypothesis, Jirjahn (2009) provides evidence
on the second aspect of works councils. He shows that workers often introduce
works councils in difficult economic situations in order to protect their investments
in human capital and in internal careers in the form of high effort levels. In a sense,
this view of rent protection complements the view taken in our paper on works
5See Addison (2009), chaps. 4-6, for a more comprehensive overview of the empirical literature
on works councils.
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councils as a rent-seeking device.
The second field of related literature deals with internal rent-seeking contests
in organizations. Konrad (2004) emphasizes that organizing rent-seeking conflicts
within a hierarchy may imply lower overall rent-seeking expenditures. Inderst et
al. (2007) show that multi-divisional organizations may suffer less from inter-
nal rent seeking than single-tier organizations, although each division exhibits a
rent-seeking contest. Kra¨kel (2008) shows that efficient and highly profitable es-
tablishments may not be founded because of the anticipated excessive rent seeking
that will follow. The three papers mentioned relate internal rent seeking to the
organizational structure or the founding of a firm, respectively, but none focuses
on the impact of establishment size on rent-seeking intensity nor on the role of
works councils or local unions.
3 The Basic Theoretical Model
We consider an establishment with a single employer E and N ≥ 2 workers.
Establishment size N is endogenous and optimally chosen by E. By employing N
workers, E realizes profit
pi (N) = θ · Y (N)− w ·N (1)
where the exogenous productivity parameter θ > 0 characterizes the economic
situation of the establishment, Y (N) is strictly concave (with Y ′(N) ≥ 0 and
Y ′′(N) < 0) describing the establishment’s production function, and w > 0 stands
for a worker’s exogenously given wage rate, which just covers his disutility of ef-
fort.6 Note that Y (N) only describes production at the aggregate establishment
level. At the disaggregate level, our setting allows (i) workers to differ in indi-
vidual abilities, (ii) efforts and abilities to be either complements or substitutes,
and (iii) different workers to be either complements or substitutes in production.
However, aggregate establishment output can be described by the concave func-
tion Y (N). The function pi (N) is assumed to have an interior maximum. Moral
6Hence, w has to be paid to the workers in any case and cannot be offset against anticipated
benefits from internal rent seeking.
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hazard problems regarding the establishment’s production are excluded.
Internal relationships are not completely covered by explicit contracts. Only
the fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of the profit is contractually guaranteed to E, whereas,
due to incomplete contracting, (1− α)pi (N) is distributed among the N workers
and the employer via internal rent seeking.7 Thus, 1 − α can be interpreted as a
measure for contract incompleteness. In the rent-seeking contest, each worker i
(i = 1, . . . , N) and employer E spend resources aj ≥ 0 (j = 1, . . . , N,E) such as
valuable time to increase their individual shares in (1− α) pi (N). These resource
investments are given in monetary terms. We follow the rent-seeking technology
suggested by Skaperdas (1996) and assume that player j (j = 1, . . . , N,E) has a
positive increasing and concave function f (·) that measures the impact of resource
expenditures on the distribution of the rent (1− α) pi (N). Moreover, we assume
that the function f (·) /f ′ (·) is convex.8 Occasionally, we will refer to the family
of power functions
f (a) =
aβ
β
with β ≤ 1 (2)
as a well-known example of a concave impact function.
Typically, the employer and the workers have different rent-seeking possibilities.
For example, E can use his formal and informal authority, whereas the workers
may threaten to withdraw future cooperation with E and newly hired outsiders
(e.g., in connection with internal knowledge transfer).9 We therefore assume that
worker i’s impact is given by f (ai + τi) (i = 1, . . . , N) and that of employer E by
f (aE + ∆) where ∆ ≥ 0 indicates E’s strength in the rent-seeking contest relative
to the workers. Workers are allowed to be heterogeneous players in the rent-seeking
game. τi ≥ 0 characterizes worker i’s exogenous talent in asserting himself in the
contest. The larger τi, the larger is i’s individual rent-seeking talent.
10 To sum
up, using the contest-success function of Skaperdas (1996), worker i’s share in
7See, e.g., Konrad (2002) and Gibbons (2005) on rent-seeking due to incomplete contracts.
8See also Inderst et al. (2007, p. 390) on this assumption. Nti (1997, p. 52) considers
the power, rational, logarithmic, and exponential functions as examples, all of which satisfy the
convexity assumption.
9This problem has already been addressed by the insider-outsider approach introduced by
Lindbeck and Snower (1987, 1988).
10Note that rent-seeking talents do not necessarily correspond to individual talents in produc-
tion.
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(1− α) pi (N) is given by si (ai) and that of employer E by sE (aE) with
si (ai) =
f (ai + τi)
F
and sE (aE) =
f (aE + ∆)
F
(3)
and F := f (aE + ∆)+
∑N
j=1 f (aj + τj). Worker i (i = 1, . . . , N) maximizes utility
uWi (ai) = (1− α) pi (N) f (ai + τi)
F
− ai, (4)
and employer E maximizes
uE(N, aE) = αpi (N) + (1− α) pi (N) f (aE + ∆)
F
− aE. (5)
The game consists of the following five stages: (1) First, nature chooses the
economic situation of the establishment, θ, which becomes publicly observable.
(2) Employer E hires N workers depending on the economic situation and the
anticipated behavior in the rent-seeking contest. (3) Establishment size N de-
termines establishment output Y (N) and, therefore, profit pi (N). (4) The N
workers and employer E choose their optimal levels of rent-seeking expenditures,
aj (j = 1, . . . , N,E). (5) Finally, each individual receives his payoff.
4 Optimal Establishment Size without a Works
Council
Before solving the game via backwards induction, the first-best outcome is derived
as a benchmark solution. Under first-best conditions, we have no contractual
problems. In particular, there is no contractual incompleteness so that α = 1. In
this situation, individuals maximize welfare by optimally choosing the first-best
level of rent-seeking activities aFBj = 0 =: a
FB (j = 1, . . . , N,E). The first-best
establishment size, NFB, then maximizes profit pi (N) implying
pi′
(
NFB
)
= 0⇔ θ · Y ′ (NFB) = w. (6)
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The first-best establishment size thus equalizes the value of marginal product and
marginal labor costs.
Under the incomplete-contract setting described in Section 3, we have α < 1
so that this solution is not achieved. In stage 4 of the game, worker i’s optimal
rent seeking is given by the first-order condition11
(1− α) pi (N)
F 2
=
1
f ′ (ai + τi)
[
f (aE + ∆) +
∑N
j 6=i f (aj + τj)
] .
Note that the first-order condition of any other worker k 6= i yields
(1− α) pi (N)
F 2
=
1
f ′ (ak + τk)
[
f (aE + ∆) +
∑N
j 6=k f (aj + τj)
] .
Employer E’s optimal rent-seeking expenditures are described by
(1− α) pi (N)
F 2
=
1
f ′ (aE + ∆)
∑N
j=1 f (aj + τj)
.
Combining the two workers’ first-order conditions gives
f (ai + τi) + F−ik
f ′ (ai + τi)
=
f (ak + τk) + F−ik
f ′ (ak + τk)
with F−ik := F−f (ai + τi)−f (ak + τk). Since both sides of the equation describe
the same monotonically increasing function of ai+τi or ak+τk, respectively, we have
ai + τi = ak + τk in equilibrium. Hence, if worker i has a comparative advantage in
internal rent seeking (i.e., τi > τk), he will use it to save expenditures as he invests
less than his opponent k; otherwise i spends more than k to avoid falling behind
his opponent in the contest. This relation holds for any pair of workers, yielding
a clear ranking of equilibrium efforts. Combining worker i’s first-order condition
with that of the employer leads to [f (ai + τi) +
∑N
j 6=i f (aj + τj)]/f
′ (ai + τi) =
[f (aE + ∆) +
∑N
j 6=i f (aj + τj)]/f
′ (aE + ∆). By the same argument as before, we
see that aE + ∆ = ai + τi.
We obtain that, in equilibrium, worker i spends a∗i = a
∗ − τi and the employer
11The second-order condition is satisfied.
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a∗E = a
∗ −∆ with
a∗ = A
(
N (1− α) pi (N)
(1 +N)2
)
,
where A denotes the inverse function of f (x) /f ′ (x). Note that A is monotonically
increasing since f (x) /f ′ (x) is increasing. Moreover, function A is concave because
f (x) /f ′ (x) is convex by assumption. Each player j (j = 1, . . . , N,E) invests more
in rent seeking the larger the rent (1− α) pi (N), or – in other words – the higher
the discretionary part of the profit, 1 − α. For a given rent (1− α) pi (N) =:
p¯i each player spends fewer resources the larger the number of contestants, N
(i.e., ∂A
(
Np¯i/ (1 +N)2
)
/ ∂N < 0). This effect can be called discouragement
effect since the relative impact of individual investment decreases in the number
of opponents behaving in the same way.12 However, here the rent itself is a function
of N that increases (decreases) in N as long as N < (>)NFB, which can either
mitigate or strengthen the discouragement effect.
Now we can solve the second stage of the game, where employer E has to decide
on optimal establishment size. E maximizes
uE(N, a
∗
E) = αpi (N) +
(1− α) pi (N)
1 +N
− A
(
N (1− α) pi (N)
(1 +N)2
)
+ ∆.
The employer’s objective function shows that, on the one hand, E may profit from
the discouragement effect by choosing a large N , which serves as a self-commitment
device ensuring that only a small amount of resources is spent at the contest stage,
thus reducing rent-seeking costs in equilibrium. On the other hand, the expression
(1− α) pi (N) / (1 +N) points to an opposite effect that makes choosing a low N
more attractive to the employer. For a given rent (1− α) pi (N), the larger the
number of rent-seeking workers, N , the smaller will be the employer’s share in the
rent (quantity effect). Altogether, when choosing optimal establishment size, the
employer has to trade off the discouragement and the quantity effect against the
direct effect of N on profit pi (N). From the first-order condition we obtain the
following result:13
12See also Nti (1997), p. 48; Wa¨rneryd (2001), p. 325.
13Although N is a positive integer, it is, for simplicity, treated as a continuous variable. To
guarantee an interior solution, we assume that the second-order conditon is satisfied, which can
only be checked for concrete specifications (consider, e.g., f (a) = a, Y (N) = N
1
2 , α = 0.9,
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Proposition 1 E chooses establishment size N∗ implicitly described by
αpi′ (N∗) =
1− α
1 +N∗
[(
pi (N∗)
1 +N∗
− pi′ (N∗)
)
(7)
−A′
(
(1− α)pi (N∗)N∗
(1 +N∗)2
)(
pi (N∗) (N∗ − 1)
(1 +N∗)2
− pi
′ (N∗)N∗
(1 +N∗)
)]
.
Recall that the first-best establishment size is defined by pi′
(
NFB
)
= 0 ac-
cording to (6). Hence, since pi (N) is a strictly concave function with an interior
maximum, we will have N∗ < (>)NFB if the right-hand side of (7) is positive
(negative). From the discussion above we know that the first term in square
brackets, pi(N
∗)
1+N∗ − pi′ (N∗), characterizes the quantity effect, whereas the second
term, −A′
(
(1−α)pi(N∗)N∗
(1+N∗)2
)(
pi(N∗)(N∗−1)
(1+N∗)2 −
pi′(N∗)N∗
(1+N∗)
)
, indicates the discouragement
effect. To illustrate the impact of both effects, imagine for a moment that both
expressions, pi(N)
1+N
−pi′ (N) and pi(N)(N−1)
(1+N)2
− pi′(N)N
(1+N)
are positive for all values of N .14
In that case, the quantity effect would favor an inefficiently small establishment
size from E’s point of view since his share in the rent decreases in the number
of rent-seekers. However, according to the discouragement effect, E would pre-
fer an inefficiently large establishment size to undermine the competition at the
rent-seeking stage. Whether the quantity effect dominates the discouragement ef-
fect or vice versa, depends on the underlying contest-success function as well as
the underlying production technology Y (N) that determines pi (N). Referring to
the family of power impact functions characterized by (2) leads to the following
clear-cut result:15
Corollary 1 If the impact function is described by (2), then N∗ < NFB.
The corollary shows that combining the so-called logit-form contest-success
function described by (3) with the family of power impact functions (2) unambigu-
ously leads to a dominance of the quantity effect relative to the discouragement
effect. However, the findings in Kra¨kel (2008) indicate that such dominance does
not necessarily hold for other contest-success functions such as the probit model.
w = 0.2, and θ = 1).
14Note that concavity of the profit function only guarantees that pi (N) /N > pi′ (N). However,
we can think of concrete specifications for which both expressions are indeed always positive;
e.g., we can again use Y (N) = N
1
2 , w = 0.2 and θ = 1.
15The proofs of Corollary 1 and the following propositions are relegated to the appendix.
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Before we switch to the case of a works council, we can finally investigate the
influence of the economic situation, indicated by θ, on optimal establishment size
and rent-seeking behavior. For illustrating purposes, we again refer to the family
of power impact functions. The following result can be derived:
Proposition 2 Let the impact function be described by (2). If Y (N
∗)
1+N∗ < Y
′ (N∗)
and β is smaller than a certain cut-off value β¯ (N∗), then ∂N∗/∂θ > 0. Otherwise,
there will exist a cut-off value α¯ so that α > α¯ implies ∂N∗/∂θ > 0.
The proof of Proposition 2 shows that
∂N∗
∂θ
=
αY ′ (N∗)− 1−α
1+N∗
[(
Y (N∗)
1+N∗ − Y ′ (N∗)
)
− β
(
Y (N∗)(N∗−1)
(1+N∗)2 −
Y ′(N∗)N∗
(1+N∗)
)]
−∂2uE(N∗, a∗E)/∂N∗2
.
Since the denominator is positive, the sign of ∂N∗/∂θ is identical to that of the
numerator. There are three effects that determine the sign. The first effect refers
to αY ′ (N∗) = ∂pi
′(N∗)
∂θ
> 0 and can be labeled productivity effect : the larger θ
the more productive will be the underlying production technology, which favors
increasing output by enlargement of N∗. The expression in square brackets de-
scribes the interplay of the two other effects – the discouragement effect and the
quantity effect – analogously to the term in square brackets in (7). This expression
can be either positive or negative.
If power parameter β is sufficiently small, the impact of the discouragement
effect will diminish, but the employer may nevertheless increase N∗. In light of the
discussion of the discouragement effect above, this finding seems odd at first sight
as E’s resource expenditures decrease in N in equilibrium. However, note that the
condition Y ′ (N∗) > Y (N
∗)
1+N∗ characterizes a situation where productivity is quite
large. In that case, the overall impact of the production technology will dominate
rent-seeking issues: Productivity is so large that the employer will unambiguously
increase production despite the fact that part of it will be lost in the rent-seeking
contest and that the quantity effect exacerbates the problem, the larger N∗. Tech-
nically, both expressions in the numerator of ∂N∗/∂θ will be positive – αY ′ (N∗)
immediately according to the productivity effect as well as the remainder of the
numerator due to Y ′ (N∗) > Y (N
∗)
1+N∗ and β < β¯ (N
∗). Since the production function
12
Y (N) is concave, the presence of a rather high productivity will primarily apply to
relatively small establishments. Consider, for example, Y (N) = N δ with δ ≤ 1 so
that Y ′ (N∗) > Y (N
∗)
1+N∗ ⇔ δ > N
∗
1+N∗ . Hence, the described situation will be relevant
if, for a given optimal number of workers, the production technology is not too
concave or if, for a given production technology, the optimal number of workers is
not too large.
If the expression in square brackets in the numerator of ∂N∗/∂θ is positive,
the sign of ∂N∗/∂θ will depend on whether production issues are more important
than rent-seeking problems. If the discretionary part of the profit is sufficiently
small (i.e., α > α¯), the productivity effect will dominate rent-seeking issues, and
the employer will prefer to increase establishment size. Of course, this will also
increase the number of internal rent-seekers, but the quantity effect is not decisive.
In particular, imagine a situation where E has initially chosen an inefficiently
small establishment size N∗ < NFB due to the dominance of the quantity effect
over the discouragement effect (see Corollary 1). If, at this moment, the economic
situation of the establishment improves (i.e., θ increases), the employer may adjust
the establishment size toward a more efficient level.
5 Optimal Establishment Size under a Works Coun-
cil
After installing a works council, workers are able to formulate and submit collec-
tive demands to the employer (e.g., a new cafeteria or additional parking lots).
Moreover, they can coordinate their interests by delegating the rent-seeking ac-
tivities to the works council. The council then acts as a single agent on behalf
of the workforce in a two-player rent-seeking contest against E.16 In Subsection
5.1, we consider the case of perfect worker coordination under a works council for
the reason that the members of the works council are either perfectly loyal toward
their co-workers or can be perfectly controlled by the workforce. This rather strong
16For the importance of a works council as a workforce’s collective rent-seeking instrument,
see Freeman and Lazear (1995) for theoretical and Frick and Mo¨ller (2003) for empirical consid-
erations.
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assumption is skipped in Subsection 5.2, where we assume that there is an agency
problem between the works council and the rest of the workforce. In such a setting,
worker coordination is imperfect, and the workforce has to create incentives for
the works council to spend effort and time in the rent-seeking contest. Subsection
5.3 addresses the special situation of mandated works councils in Germany.
5.1 Perfect Coordination under a Works Council
In this subsection, we abstract from possible agency problems between the works
council and the rest of the workforce. Technically, this means that the N workers
collectively decide on the total rent-seeking expenditures aW that are to be invested
by the works council in the two-player contest against E for the distribution of
discretionary profit (1− α) pi (N). These expenditures aW are equally borne by the
N workers. Again, we solve the game by backwards induction. At the rent-seeking
stage, worker i’s objective function can be written as
uWi (aW ) =
(1− α) pi (N)
N
f (aW )
f (aE + ∆E) + f (aW )
− aW
N
(8)
and that of employer E as
uE (N, aE) = αpi (N) + (1− α) pi (N) f (aE + ∆E)
f (aE + ∆E) + f (aW )
− aE (9)
with ∆E indicating the strength of employer E relative to the authority of the
works council in the two-player contest. Since, for ease of notation, we skipped
the influence of individual talents on the works council’s impact function and since
installing a works council typically increases the power of the workforce, ∆E < ∆
seems realistic. The two first-order conditions together yield
(1− α)pi (N)
[f (aE + ∆E) + f (aW )]2
=
1
f ′ (aE + ∆E) f (aW )
=
1
f (aE + ∆E) f ′ (aW )
.
From the last equality we obtain f(aE + ∆E)/f
′(aE + ∆E) = f (aW ) /f ′ (aW ) and,
hence, aE + ∆E = aW . Therefore, optimal expenditures are
a∗W = A
(
(1− α) pi (N)
4
)
and a∗E = A
(
(1− α) pi (N)
4
)
−∆E. (10)
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At the second stage of the game, E decides on establishment size. Under a
works council with perfect worker coordination, E chooses N∗ in order to maximize
uE (N, a
∗
E) = αpi (N) +
(1− α) pi (N)
2
− A
(
(1− α) pi (N)
4
)
+ ∆E.
We obtain the following result:17
Proposition 3 Under a works council, E implements NFB.
This proposition highlights that the introduction of a works council, which
serves purely as a rent-seeking device of the workforce, leads to efficient establish-
ment size. The intuition is the following: without a works council, the employer
chooses the optimal N that trades off production against rent-seeking issues. Un-
der a works council, however, this trade-off disappears since workers coordinate
their actions, and E can no longer influence the workforce’s rent-seeking behavior
by varying N . Accordingly, the employer’s sole concern is for production, so that
he chooses the efficient establishment size NFB.
Having solved the complete game under a works council, we can now compare
the employer’s rent-seeking expenditures with and without a works council for
optimally chosen establishment sizes. We have to contrast a∗E according to (10)
for N = NFB with a∗ −∆ from Section 4. Since 1
4
> N
∗
(1+N∗)2 (with N
∗ denoting
optimal establishment size without a works council) and pi(NFB) > pi(N∗), we
immediately obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 If ∆E ≤ ∆, the employer will invest more in rent seeking under
a works council.
In case of ∆E < ∆, the employer chooses higher rent-seeking expenditures
under a works council for three reasons: First, the reduction from N + 1 to 2 con-
testants leads to more aggressive behavior of each player in the contest (i.e., the
discouragement effect is reversed). Second, implementation of the efficient estab-
lishment size maximizes the rent (1− α) pi (N) and, therefore, players’ incentives
17As in Section 4, again we concentrate on the case of interior solutions. For example, within
the class of power impact functions (2) only interior solutions exist.
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in the contest. Third and last, E invests the additional amount ∆ − ∆E in rent
seeking to compensate for the loss in relative strength.
According to Proposition 3, E benefits from a works council because it dis-
entangles production and rent-seeking issues so that the employer chooses the
efficient establishment size. However, Proposition 4 points out that a works coun-
cil is also detrimental to E as it increases his waste of resources in the rent-seeking
contest. As in Section 4, let N∗ denote optimal establishment size without a works
council. Comparing E’s objective functions with and without a works council in
equilibrium then leads to the following result:
Proposition 5 Let ∆ = ∆E. The employer will benefit from a works council if
and only if
α
[
pi
(
NFB
)− pi (N∗)]+ (1− α)[pi (NFB)
2
− pi (N
∗)
1 +N∗
]
> A
(
(1− α) pi (NFB)
4
)
− A
(
N∗ (1− α) pi (N∗)
(1 +N∗)2
)
.
Both sides of the inequality are strictly positive for α ∈ (0, 1) since pi (NFB) >
pi (N∗) and 1
2
> 1
1+N
as well as 1
4
> N
(1+N)2
. The right-hand side measures E’s
disadvantage from a works council in the form of higher expenditures arising from
a more aggressive behavior in the rent-seeking contest, which is reinforced by a
larger rent (1− α) pi (NFB) > (1− α) pi (N∗). The left-hand side describes E’s
efficiency gains from a works council, inducing the first-best establishment size.
Moreover, the left-hand side shows that when there is a works council, the employer
also obtains a larger share in the rent (1− α) pi (N) since 1
2
> 1
1+N
. Note that the
welfare effects of a works council are not clear. As pointed out above, welfare
increases due to the implementation of the efficient scale of production. However,
concerning rent seeking a works council is only welfare improving if the increased
waste of resources of E is outweighed by a reduced number of rent seekers.
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5.2 Imperfect Coordination under a Works Council
In this subsection, we skip the assumption of perfect worker coordination. Instead,
we assume that there is an agency problem between the n < N members of the
works council and their N − n co-workers.18 The incentive problem arises from
the fact that council members have to bear personal costs when investing in rent
seeking and that their efforts cannot be perfectly controlled by the N − n other
workers. However, the N −n non-council members can set up an incentive scheme
in order to influence the council members’ behavior.
We assume that the n members collectively decide on the works council’s in-
vestment in the rent-seeking contest, which is again denoted by aW . The corre-
sponding costs aW are equally borne by all council members. The N − n non-
council members cannot directly determine aW , but they can create incentives
for the council members by offering them a share γ ∈ (0, 1) in the acquired rent
(1− α)pi(N)f(aW )/ [f(aE + ∆E) + f(aW )]. The remaining share 1− γ accrues to
the N − n non-council members. Hence, each council member realizes utility
uc (aW ) =
γ(1− α)pi(N)
n
f(aW )
f(aE + ∆E) + f(aW )
− aW
n
whereas each non-council member gets utility
unc (aW ) =
(1− γ)(1− α)pi(N)
N − n
f(aW )
f(aE + ∆E) + f(aW )
.
Share γ is chosen such that workers’ total income n · uc (aW ) + (N − n) · unc (aW )
is maximized. For analytical tractability, we assume that the impact function f
belongs to the family of power functions, being described by (2). The timing of the
game is identical to the one in Subsection 5.1 with the exception that prior to the
contest the workers fix share γ that satisfies maxγ (n · uc (aW ) + (N − n) · unc (aW ))
and that during the contest the n council members together choose aW to maximize
uc.
The game is solved by backward induction, beginning with the simultaneous
choices of aW and aE in the contest for a given share γ and given establishment
18We do not discuss how the members of the works council are selected. For example, we can
assume that each worker becomes a member with probability n/N .
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size N . Whereas the council members maximize uc, the employer chooses aE in
order to maximize (8). Using (2), the first-order conditions can be summarized to
β(1− α)pi(N)
[(aE + ∆E)β + a
β
W ]
2
=
1
γ(aE + ∆E)βa
β−1
W
=
1
(aE + ∆E)β−1a
β
W
Solving for the optimal rent-seeking expenditures a∗E and a
∗
W yields γ(a
∗
E + ∆E) =
a∗W and, finally,
a∗E =
βγβ(1− α)pi(N)
(1 + γβ)2
−∆E and a∗W =
βγβ+1(1− α)pi(N)
(1 + γβ)2
. (11)
Prior to the contest, the workers choose
γ∗ = arg max
γ
(n · uc (a∗W ) + (N − n) · unc (a∗W ))
= arg max
γ
(
(1− α)pi(N)γ
β
(
γβ − βγ + 1)
(γβ + 1)2
)
.
Assuming that the workers’ objective function is strictly concave,19 γ∗ is described
by the first-order condition, which can be rewritten to
(1 + β) γ∗ + (1− β) γ∗β+1 − (1 + γ∗β) = 0.
Implicit differentiation shows that ∂γ∗/∂β > 0. Hence, optimal incentives increase
in the power parameter, which is also intuitively plausible: the greater the marginal
impact of an effort increase, the higher should be the optimal incentives set by the
workers for the works council.
At the beginning of the game, the employer chooses optimal establishment
size. He maximizes (8), anticipating that the workers will set incentives γ∗ and
that equilibrium expenditures in the contest will be a∗E and a
∗
W . Inserting into (8)
leads to
uE (N ; γ
∗) =
(
α + (1− α)1 + (1− β) γ
∗β
(γ∗β + 1)2
)
pi(N) + ∆E
as E’s objective function. The first-order condition immediately yields pi′(N) =
19For given values of β (e.g., β = 1 or β = 0.5), it can be easily checked that this is indeed the
case.
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0. Hence, the employer prefers to choose the efficient establishment size NFB.
The intuition is the same as under perfect worker coordination: introduction of a
works council disentangles production and rent-seeking issues when fixing optimal
establishment size. As a consequence, the discouragement effect and the quantity
effect are eliminated and E pays attention exclusively to efficient production.
Comparing the outcome without a works council to that under a works council
with imperfect worker coordination gives the following result:
Proposition 6 Under imperfect worker coordination, E implements NFB. Let
∆E ≤ ∆; if γ∗ is sufficiently large, employer E will invest more in rent seeking
under a works council than without a works council. If ∆E = ∆, the employer
strictly benefits from a works council.
As under perfect worker coordination, E fixes establishment size at the efficient
level because the introduction of a works council deletes both the discouragement
and the quantity effect. It is not clear, though, whether E spends more resources
under a works council than without one. Again, a higher rent and a reduction
in the number of contestants boost the competition in the contest, and E wants
to compensate for the lost relative authority ∆ − ∆E. However, if the players’
marginal impact in the contest is very low so that it does not pay for the workers
to induce high incentives γ∗, the waste of resources in the rent-seeking contest will
be rather low. If this effect dominates the three other effects, E will invest less
resources under a works council with imperfect worker coordination than without
a council. Restored production efficiency, the induced distribution of the rent
between employer and workforce, and the induced resource expenditures together
make E prefer the introduction of a works council with imperfect coordination.
5.3 The Case of German Works Councils
In Germany, the Works Constitution Act allows workers to establish a works coun-
cil, if the number of workers exceeds a threshold of four regular workers. Since
the employer cannot veto the establishment of a works council, we speak of a
mandatory works council. The Works Constitution Act assures the workforce a
particular bundle of codetermination rights. This bundle further increases when
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the establishment size exceeds certain thresholds. Moreover, the employer has to
bear the full costs of setting up and running a works council, and these costs rise
in establishment size. For example, the employer has to pay a number of full-time
council members, and their number increases in establishment size.20
We could supplement our model by adding two characteristics specific to Ger-
man works councils. A bundle of codetermination rights that increases in estab-
lishment size could be modeled via replacing ∆E by ∆E (N) with ∆
′
E (N) < 0 (i.e.,
E’s relative strength decreases in the number of employed workers). In addition,
we could introduce a new cost function κ (N) > 0 with κ′ (N) > 0 that denotes
E’s operational costs from running a works council. κ (N) is subtracted from the
employer’s utility uE.
Irrespective of whether we add ∆E (N) and κ (N) to the works council model
with perfect or imperfect worker coordination, the consequence for E’s optimal
choice of establishment size is qualitatively the same: both functions penalize firm
growth and, thus, induce the employer to adjust the efficient establishment size
downwards. Several empirical papers have analyzed the impact of the German
Employment Protection Act and the Works Constitution Act on the growth of
German workforces.21 Both laws have led to an increase in employment rights and
to additional costs for the employer where the establishment size exceeds certain
thresholds. However, none of the papers finds that the legal thresholds prescribed
in the two laws have retarded firm growth in Germany.
In each of the two scenarios, with and without a works council, the unions
also play an important role in workers’ wages in Germany. Typically one union
collectively bargains with the corresponding employers’ association for industry-
wide wages and working conditions. The collective agreement defines the minimum
requirements for all workers – irrespective of their being members of a union or
not – employed by firms which belong to a certain sector and region (e.g., the
metal working industry in North Rhine-Westphalia). Works councils, which are
installed at establishment level, also have a say in workers’ wages. The situation in
20See Addison et al. (2000, p. 16) and Addison et al. (2001, pp. 663-665) on the council’s
authority and the employer’s operational costs for a council, which both increase in establishment
size.
21See Wagner et al. (2001), Verick (2004), Burgert (2006), Koller et al. (2008), and Koller
(2010).
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Germany is characterized by vaguely defined jobs and exactly defined pay-grades,
that is, by a rough description of tasks performed at a certain job, on the one
hand, and precisely calculated wages, on the other. The rough characterization of
jobs entails bargaining at establishment level about which jobs should be assigned
to which pay-grades. More intense rent-seeking in a particular establishment –
either by individual workers or by a works council, as a collective representative of
the whole workforce – leads to more jobs and, hence, to more workers benefiting
from higher pay-grades within that establishment. If workers act as individual
rent-seekers, an upgrading of some workers often leads to a downgrading of others.
However, a works council tends to redistribute income from the employer to the
workforce as a whole. These characteristics fit quite well with our set-up, where a
works council leads to worker coordination. In our econometric analysis, based on
German data, we control for the influence of collective wage bargaining via unions
at industry and firm levels.
6 Empirical Evidence
This section offers an empirical analysis of the main theoretical statements, the
aim being twofold. (1) Without a works council, there are two countervailing
effects which influence the rent seeking of workers – the discouragement and the
quantity effect. Hence, we seek empirical evidence on which of the two effects is
more relevant in practice. (2) According to theory, the introduction of a works
council erases both the discouragement and the quantity effect, under either degree
of worker coordination. Intuitively, the works council substitutes the N individual
workers as rent seekers. What remains is the influence of establishment size on
profit, but this is also the case where there is no works council. We therefore expect
that in establishments with a works council the number of workers no longer has a
significant influence on the degree of rent seeking. At least, we assume that works
councils mitigate the quantity or discouragement effect, respectively.
For our investigation we use the data of the Establishment Panel of the German
Institute for Employment Research (IAB). This establishment-level survey con-
tains information about the establishments’ business policies and developments,
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innovations, workforce structures, recruitment and separation decisions, wages,
working times, apprenticeship, and further training programs, industrial relations,
etc. Meanwhile, the Establishment Panel provides yearly information about more
than 16,000 establishments of all establishment sizes and industries, which makes
it the most extensive establishment-level data set in Germany. In our empirical
investigation we make use of the recent panel waves of the years 2001 to 2008.22
6.1 Econometric Model
In order to investigate the importance of the quantity and the discouragement
effect empirically, our econometric model must reflect the internal contest for the
contractually not guaranteed part of establishment profit, (1− α) pi (N). Specif-
ically, we need an empirical measure that illustrates the distribution of this part
between employer and workers. A natural candidate to meet this requirement
is an establishment’s wage bill-to-total sales ratio W/Y . This holds for several
reasons. First, W/Y can be interpreted in terms of establishment profitability be-
cause it captures the amount of establishment productivity earned by the workers.
W/Y thus illustrates inverse establishment profitability in relative terms. Second,
0 ≤ W/Y ≤ 1 so that W/Y can be interpreted as a share. Third, to some extent
W/Y reflects the workers’ share in (1− α) pi (N), i.e., ∑Ni=1 si(ai), where si(ai)
is defined in equation (3). Finally, larger values of W/Y indicate an increasing
share of establishment output being transferred to the N workers at the expense
of employer E, which illustrates the redistribution issue that is associated with
rent-seeking contests. In particular, as mentioned in Subsection 5.3, rent seek-
ing in German establishments can influence the assignment of jobs to pay-grades.
More intense rent seeking is therefore likely to yield an upgrading of jobs, thus
22Our analysis is restricted to establishments that employ at least five workers. The reason
for this restriction is that, according to the German Works Constitution Act, employees are
only allowed to elect a works council when the total workforce of the establishment exceeds the
number of four employees. We also exclude agricultural and forestry establishments, non-profit
establishments, and the public sector. Furthermore, we exclude establishments of the banking
and insurance sector because our dependent variable (wage bill-to-sales ratio) is based on total
sales. However, since the corresponding measure for banks and insurance companies is based on
total assets instead of total sales, we decided not to consider them in our analysis. Finally, we
adjusted our sample by eliminating obvious outliers, e.g., regarding establishment size and the
wage bill-to-total sales ratio.
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increasing the total wage bill relative to sales. All in all, therefore, our empirical
measure comes quite close to the corresponding theoretical measure, which is why
we use S = W/Y as the dependent variable in our empirical model.23
Both the quantity and the discouragement effect directly relate the amount of
rent-seeking activities to establishment size. Hence, our first explanatory variable
of interest is establishment size, which is measured by the number of workers, N .
Regressing S on N provides us with information as to whether the quantity effect
or the discouragement effect is actually valid. Our second variable of interest,
C, is a dummy variable indicating whether or not an establishment has a works
council. According to the implications of our theoretical model, a works council
may reinforce or mitigate rent-seeking activities. A reinforcing effect is likely to
occur if we observe the discouragement effect, while a mitigating effect can be
expected under the conditions of the quantity effect.
In our baseline specification, we separate establishments under a works council
(C = 1) from establishments without a works council (C = 0). The corresponding
estimation equations can be written as
S0it = α0Nit +Xitβ0 + µ0i + ξ0t + u0it (12)
S1it = α1Nit +Xitβ1 + µ1i + ξ1t + u1it . (13)
Equation (12) represents the regime of establishments without a works council,
while equation (13) represents establishments under a works council. X is a ma-
trix of control variables. The subscripts i and t indicate establishment and time,
respectively. α0, α1, β0, and β1 are the parameters to be estimated, where we are
particularly interested in α0 and α1. Potential macroeconomic shocks are specified
by ξ0t and ξ1t and will be captured by a series of time dummies. Regarding the
error terms, we apply the usual white noise assumptions, i.e., u0 ∼ N(0, σ20) and
23To the best of our knowledge, using the wages-to-total sales ratio as a rent-seeking measure is
quite unique. However, according to the related literature it is not unusual to apply profitability
measures as an indicator of rent seeking. For example, Kraft and Lang (2008) and Jirjahn
(2009) use the subjective evaluations made by establishment representatives of establishment
profitability to construct a rent-seeking indicator. Furthermore, Beckmann et al. (2010) use
value added, value added per capita, value added minus wages, and value added minus wages
per capita as alternative rent-seeking measures. As a final point, the idea to examine rent-
seeking behavior in a regression model, where the dependent variable indicates firm profitability,
has already been applied in Hirsch (1990).
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u1 ∼ N(0, σ21). Finally, µ0i and µ1i reflect unobserved time-invariant establish-
ment characteristics (e.g., management quality). If these establishment-specific
effects were correlated with both the explanatory and dependent variables in (12)
and (13), the parameter estimates would be biased and inconsistent, unless the
estimation approach explicitly controls for unobserved heterogeneity. In order to
eliminate potential biases caused by unobserved fixed effects, we exploit the panel
structure of our data and apply the within estimator.
However, apart from unobserved establishment characteristics the parameter
estimates may be affected by another endogeneity problem, i.e., selectivity. The
selectivity problem may arise because establishments are not randomly assigned
to a certain works council regime. Potential selection biases in the parameter
estimates can be avoided by specifying an endogenous switching regression model
(Maddala 1983):
S0it = α0Nit +Xitβ0 + µ0i + ξ0t + u0it (14)
S1it = α1Nit +Xitβ1 + µ1i + ξ1t + u1it (15)
C∗it = δNit + Zitγ + νi + ζt + εit . (16)
Equation (16) explicitly addresses the selectivity problem in terms of works council
status by modeling the determination of the workers’ propensity to elect a works
council C∗. Theoretically, C∗ depends on the profitability differences between
establishments with and without a works council and the costs associated with
the existence of a works council. Empirically, the relative benefit of an existing
works council is captured by a set of establishment characteristics given by N and
Z, where Z = [X I] and I contains identifying instrumental variables not included
in equations (14) and (15). νi and ζt in (16) correspond to µji and ξjt, (j = 0, 1)
in the regime equations.
Since C∗ is a latent variable and thus unobserved, we replace C∗ in equation
(16) with a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the establishment has a works
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council and 0 if it does not, i.e.,
Cit =
1 if C
∗
it > 0
0 if C∗it ≤ 0 .
(17)
In order to account for both selectivity and unobserved establishment charac-
teristics simultaneously, we augment our endogenous switching regression model,
applying an approach suggested by Mundlak (1978). That means we parameterize
the establishment-specific effects as a linear function of the within establishment
means of all (time varying) explanatory variables,24 i.e.,
µji = α˜jN¯i + X¯iβ˜j + ωji ; j = 0, 1 (18)
and
νi = δ˜N¯i + Z¯iγ˜ + ηi . (19)
Here, N¯i = 1/Ti
∑
tNit, X¯i = 1/Ti
∑
tXit, and Z¯i = 1/Ti
∑
t Zit with Ti being
the span of years an establishment can be observed in the panel data set. The
unobserved effects ωji and ηi are assumed to be uncorrelated with the original
regressors N , X and Z, respectively, where ωji ∼ N(0, σ2ωj) and ηi ∼ N(0, σ2η).
By adding expressions (18) and (19) to the regime equations (14) and (15) and
the selection equation (16), our econometric model, which simultaneously accounts
for unobserved heterogeneity and selectivity, takes the following form:
S0it = α0Nit +Xitβ0 + ξ0t + α˜0N¯i + X¯iβ˜0 + ω0i + u0it (20)
S1it = α1Nit +Xitβ1 + ξ1t + α˜1N¯i + X¯iβ˜1 + ω1i + u1it (21)
Cit = δNit + Zitγ + ζt + δ˜N¯i + Z¯iγ˜ + ηi + εit . (22)
24Our procedure is similar to the estimation strategy applied in Dustmann and Schmidt (2000),
who investigate the wage effects of immigrant women working full-time, part-time, or not at all.
The authors also combine an endogenous switching regression model with the Mundlak approach.
Moreover, Beatty et al. (2010) estimate an endogenous switching regression model using within-
establishment means in the selection and the regime equations to exploit the panel structure
of their data. Finally, the Mundlak approach or the related Chamberlain-Mundlak approach,
controlling for correlated fixed effects, has recently been used, e.g., in Jones et al. (2007), Abdulai
and Tietje (2007), and Fitzenberger et al. (2011).
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For the composite error terms in equations (20), (21), and (22), i.e., ωji+ujit = u˜jit
(j = 0, 1) and ηi + εit = ε˜it, we assume a jointly trivariate normal distribution,
where the variances are given by σ2u˜jt and σ
2
ε˜ = 1. The covariances between the
composite error terms of the regime equations u˜jit and the selection equation ε˜it
are defined as σ(ε˜,u˜j)t so that the corresponding correlation coefficients are obtained
by ρ(ε˜,u˜j)t = σ(ε˜,u˜j)t/σu˜jt (Dustmann and Schmidt 2000, p. 7).
The equation system (20), (21), and (22) is estimated simultaneously using the
full information maximum likelihood method (Lokshin and Sajaia 2004). Remem-
ber that we are particularly interested in the estimates of α0 and α1. For example,
α0 > 0 and α0 > α1 ≥ 0 would provide some evidence for the quantity effect being
present in establishments without a works council, whereas works councils tend
to mitigate the workers’ rent-seeking activities. On the other hand, α0 < 0 and
α0 < α1 ≤ 0 would indicate a presence of the discouragement effect in establish-
ments without a works council, whereas works councils engage in rent seeking, at
least to some extent, thereby counteracting the discouragement effect.
Note that our data capture the observation period between the years 2001
and 2008. Within this time span, there are only a few establishments that have
switched from the non-works council to the works council regime or vice versa.
All in all, we identified less than 5 % of the establishments as status switchers.
From the methodological viewpoint, however, the existence of status switchers is
associated with the rather confusing fact that one particular establishment might
belong to different regimes (20) and (21) at different times. Intuitively, we think
of works council status as a (quasi) time-invariant variable, at least over a rela-
tive short observation period of eight years. In order to ensure that a particular
establishment either belongs to the works council regime or the non-works council
regime over the entire observation period, we exclude the ’status switchers’ from
our model. This means we are interested in the question of whether the estimation
results are substantially influenced by the status switchers. In this variant of our
endogenous switching regression model, the selection equation (22) thus changes
to
Ci = δ˜N¯i + Z¯iγ˜ + η˜i . (23)
All in all, therefore, we provide estimation results for the equation system (20),
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(21), and (22) as well as for its variant (20), (21), and (23).
6.2 Estimation Results
In order to be able to interpret the parameters α0 and α1 in the sense of the
quantity or the discouragement effect, respectively, our econometric model must
consider alternative explanations for inverse establishment profitability S beyond
the assumed rent-seeking effects. These alternative explanations are captured by
the control variables matrix X. For example, establishment profitability may
be affected by technological investments or the internal diffusion of technological
innovations. Similarly, establishments with a large share of skilled and high-skilled
workers are also likely to differ from establishments employing mostly unskilled
workers in terms of profitability. Consequently, our regressor matrix X includes
two measures on technological innovations (technical state of technologies in use,
expansion investments per capita) as well as the share of skilled workers (and
other variables providing information on the structure of the workforce). Finally,
S might also be driven by collective wage bargaining arrangements as well as extra
payments above the level of negotiated wages. These extra payments might be paid
in order to increase the workers’ effort or retain the most productive employees.
Our regressor matrix therefore contains the corresponding dummy variables for
union representation25 and the existence of extra payments that go beyond the
collectively bargained wage level. Hence, by explicitly addressing these alternative
explanations, the control variables in X contribute to improving the accuracy of
α0 and α1 being interpreted as rent-seeking effects.
Regarding the remaining control variables, we consider measures that are quite
standard in the literature on performance effects of works councils or other forms of
employee participation (e.g., Addison et al. 2001, Addison et al. 2006, Zwick 2004,
Kraft and Lang 2008). For example, the influence of an establishment’s activities
abroad is captured by the export share. Finally, X contains measures on sector
25Alternatively, we ran both the fixed effects models as well as the endogenous switching
regression models replacing the collective wage bargaining variable by two dummy variables
capturing establishment-level and sectoral-level collective bargaining, respectively. However, we
did not achieve additional insights from splitting the collective bargaining dummy into two parts,
so we decided not to change our original specification.
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and regional affiliation as well as other relevant establishment characteristics.26
As the discussion in the previous subsection makes clear, works council status
is likely to be endogenous. In order to avoid a parameter identification that relies
solely on functional form assumptions, the Z (Z¯) matrix in selection equations
(22) and (23), respectively must contain one or more exclusion restrictions, i.e.,
identifying variables that are not included in X (X¯).27 To be a valid instrument,
an exclusion restriction must be relevant (i.e., it must be correlated with works
council status) and exogenous (i.e., it should not be correlated with the error terms
in the regime equations).
In the present case, we apply two exclusion restrictions to instrument works
council status. First, we use a measure of establishment age, expecting that older
establishments are more likely to have a works council than younger ones.28 This
assumption can be explained by a simple time effect. In older establishments
workers have already had more opportunities to elect a works council than their
colleagues in younger establishments. In order to capture this age effect, we gen-
erate a dummy variable that indicates whether or not an establishment has been
founded later than 1990. If our expectations were true, this dummy variable should
be negatively correlated with works council incidence. Moreover, regarding the ex-
ogeneity requirement there is no reason to assume that establishment age has a
direct influence on establishment performance (i.e., wage bill-to-total sales ratio in
the present case).
Our second exclusion restriction is a dummy variable indicating whether or
not an establishment expects a reduction in total employment.29 We assume that
negative employment expectations are more likely to prevail in works council es-
26A description of all variables applied in the empirical investigation can be found in Table 3
in the appendix.
27On the other hand, note that identification of the parameters of an endogeneous switching
regression model does not necessarily require the Z (Z¯) matrix to contain each of the X (X¯)
variables.
28Empirical evidence confirming this hypothesis can be found, e.g., in Addison et al. (1997).
Fister (2002) proceeds similarly to our identification strategy using company age as an instrument
for unionization instead of works council incidence.
29For example, Kraft and Lang (2008) and Jirjahn (2009) also use variables on employment
changes as potential determinants of works council adoption. While Jirjahn (2009) examines
the impact of employment growth on works council introduction, Kraft and Lang (2008) specify
two dummy variables capturing future employment expectations and estimate their influence on
works council introduction.
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tablishments. Our argument is based on the insider-outsider approach of Lindbeck
and Snower (1987, 1988). According to this approach, a works council is primar-
ily interested in protecting the insiders against the employer and potentially new
employees (outsiders). In particular, the works council wants to shift rents from
the employer to the insiders and to inhibit the hiring of outsiders, who would oth-
erwise participate in the insider rents. As a consequence, the employer expects a
non-increasing establishment size and, in times of crisis, a decreasing one. Hence,
we assume that establishments with negative employment expectations are more
likely to have a works council. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that
an establishment’s expectation regarding employment growth has a direct impact
on its current profitability.
Corresponding to our methodological approach, i.e., addressing unobserved es-
tablishment characteristics and selectivity issues simultaneously, we use the within
means of both the establishment age dummy and the employment expectations
dummy in each of the selection equations (22) and (23).30 Note that since we
desist from additionally applying the establishments’ periodical values of our ex-
clusion restrictions, Zit in (22) alters to Xit.
The estimates for our main explanatory variable N resulting from our baseline
fixed effects models (12) and (13) as well as the equation systems (20), (21), (22)
and (20), (21), (23) are displayed in Table 1.31
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The most striking result is that establishment size has a significantly negative
effect on the wage bill-to-total sales ratio in establishments without a works council
(α0 < 0). This holds in all of our specifications irrespective of whether or not
we account for the endogeneity of works council status. However, the estimates
30Contrary to a first conjecture the establishment age dummy is not time-constant. About
7.5 % of the establishments in our sample exhibit at least one change in the establishment age
dummy over time. This time-variation can be explained by organizational changes within estab-
lishments. For example, establishments may have executed insourcing or outsourcing activities
within the considered time-span. Another explanation is a change with regard to ownership.
These organizational changes might be interpreted as quasi new foundations.
31The estimates for the control variables and the selection equation of model (20), (21), and
(22) can be found in Table 4 in the appendix. The corresponding estimates of equation system
(20), (21), (23) are available from the authors upon request.
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of the correlation coefficients ρε˜,0 = ρε˜,u˜0 and ρε˜,1 = ρε˜,u˜1 as well as the Wald
test on independence of the selection and regime equations clearly demonstrate
the requirement of accounting for selectivity. Contrary to the non-works council
regime, we find no significant establishment size effect on the wage bill-to-total
sales ratio for establishments under a works council (α1 = 0). A Wald test on
α0 = α1 shows that the establishment size effect significantly differs between the
works council and the non-works council regime.
Furthermore, the positive estimates of ρε˜,0 and ρε˜,1 indicate that establishments
self-selecting into a certain works council regime are more profitable than a ran-
dom establishment from the sample would have been.32 In particular this holds for
establishments in the non-works council regime (ρε˜,0 is highly significant) and to a
lesser extent for establishments choosing the works council regime (ρε˜,1 is insignif-
icant). Two tests confirm the validity of our exclusion restrictions. First, a χ2-test
on joint significance of the exclusion restrictions strongly support the relevance of
both instruments. Second, according to the χ2-test of overidentification we can-
not reject the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments.33 Finally, the χ2-test on
joint significance of the controls for correlated fixed effects clearly demonstrates
the necessity of taking unobserved establishment characteristics into account.
All in all, we conclude from our results that there is no empirical evidence
for the quantity effect. However, the results support the hypothesis of a discour-
agement effect to be observed in establishments without a works council. Hence,
the wage bill-to-total sales ratio decreases (or, equivalently, relative profitability
increases) with establishment size only in establishments without a works council
but not those with a works council. This finding indicates that works councils aim
at intensifying rent-seeking activities by acting against the discouragement effect.
32Note that a positive correlation coefficient implies that self-selection is associated with a
lower wage bill-to-total sales ratio relative to random assignment.
33Since there is no standard test of overidentifying exclusion restrictions in the context of an
endogeneous switching regression model, we alternatively perform the Sargan test known, e.g.,
from the two-stage least squares framework as well as the Hausman test, which is also applied
in Lokshin and Beegle (2011). By means of an F -test we finally check whether our exclusion
restrictions are jointly insignificant in the regime equations using the estimated regime residuals
as dependent variables. Table 1 displays the statistics from the conventional Sargan test used for
model (20), (21), (22) and a modified Sargan test used for model (20), (21), (23). The modified
Sargan test takes into account that selection equation (23) does only include within means and
no periodical values. The results of the Hausman test and the F -test are in line with the statistics
reported.
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We conducted several sensitivity checks to test whether our fixed effects and
endogenous switching regression model estimates are robust to alternative specifi-
cations. First, we considered the common observation that almost all of the very
large establishments have a works council, so establishment size N might be trun-
cated at higher values in the non-works council regime. We therefore ran additional
regressions using a restricted sample in which maximum establishment size is deter-
mined by the largest establishment without a works council. Proceeding that way,
we secure that both the smallest and the largest establishments in the sample may
or may not have a works council. Maximum establishment size in the restricted
sample is N = 5, 011, while it is N = 19, 671 in the unrestricted sample.34 The
estimation results of the restricted sample are very similar to the results presented.
Most importantly, we can still observe a significant discouragement effect in the
non-works council regime, but we find no significant establishment size effect in
the works council regime. Second, we examined whether our results change, when
we assume a non-linear establishment size effect on rent seeking. For this purpose,
we specified both a semi-logarithmic model using lnN as our main explanatory
variable and a quadratic version adding N2 to the original specification. Again, the
estimation results are consistent with the results presented in the paper. Third,
we replaced our dependent variable, i.e., the wage bill-to-total sales ratio, by the
wage bill-to-value added ratio and thus test, whether our results are affected by the
choice of our rent-seeking measure. However, we obtain qualitatively very similar
results with respect to magnitude and significance of the observed discouragement
effect.35 Finally, we checked whether our estimates depend on the choice of our
exclusion restrictions. Precisely, we examined whether our findings alter, when we
include only one of the exclusion restrictions (within mean of the establishment
age or the employment expectations dummy) to the selection equations instead of
both. We also experienced with a specification treating the periodical values as
well as the within means of both dummy variables as exclusion restrictions in (22).
34Restricting the sample was associated with a reduction in the number of observations (es-
tablishments) by 100 (29) from 54,573 (18,229) to 54,473 (18,200).
35We prefer a specification containing the wage bill-to-total sales ratio rather than the wage
bill-to-value added ratio in order to avoid a potential item non-response bias that might be
associated with applying the value added variable.
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Again, we obtain estimates confirming our previous findings.36
6.3 Complementing Model Specification
Remember that in the previous empirical analysis we used an establishment’s wage
bill-to-total sales ratio Si = Wi/Yi as a measure for rent seeking (conditional on the
covariates). In the first instance, however, S may be seen as providing information
mainly on (inverse) profitability or cost effectiveness rather than rent seeking. The
question is: How we can be convinced that interpreting S in terms of rent seeking is
appropriate? In order to check our interpretation of S as a rent-seeking indicator,
we specify an additional estimation model. If the results of this complementing
model were consistent with our reasoning so far, the view of S to be interpreted
as a rent-seeking measure would gain additional support.
In our complementing specification, we regress our rent-seeking measure S
on a set of explanatory variables providing new information on the quality of
cooperation between management and works council. More precisely, the level of
cooperation with the works council is captured by three dummy variables. The
first dummy variable captures establishments where the management faces a rather
non-cooperative works council usually opposing management decisions (Cnc). The
second dummy variable captures establishments with a rather cooperative works
council that typically agrees with management decisions (Cc). The final dummy
variable captures establishments with works councils whose behavior is somewhere
in between cooperative and non-cooperative behavior.37
We expect the cooperative works councils to succeed in rent-seeking activities
so that the impact of Cc on S1 should be positive and larger than the effect of C
nc
on S1.
38 The rationale for this hypothesis is that cooperative works councils, due
to reciprocity, are more likely to succeed in bargaining with the management – e.g.,
in terms of upgrading workers or assigning jobs to higher pay-grades – than non-
cooperative works councils. In other words, firms have paid for the cooperation
36The results of the sensitivity checks are available from the authors upon request.
37This type of works council serves as our reference group, so the corresponding dummy variable
is excluded from equation (24).
38Just as in the previous subsections, the value 1 indexes establishments belonging to the works
council regime.
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with the works council by leaving the workforce a larger share in the rent.39 Hence,
a positive impact of cooperative works councils on the wage bill-to-total sales ratio
would also support our view of S = W/Y as a measure for rent-seeking activities.
If, on the other hand, S were a pure profitability indicator free from rent-seeking
issues, we would rather expect a negative impact of cooperative works councils
because, in this case, a good cooperation between management and works council
should turn out to be profitability enhancing.
Our basic regression model for the effect of the degree of works council coop-
eration can be written as
S1it = α1Nit +Xitβ1 + λncC
nc
it + λcC
c
it + µ1i + ξ1t + u1it . (24)
Since Cnc and Cc are only observed in one of the panel waves (2006), we cannot
apply the conventional strategies to control for unobserved establishment hetero-
geneity and selectivity. In order to account for unobserved establishment char-
acteristics, we therefore apply a two-step estimation procedure in analogy to the
approaches proposed, for example, in Hirsch (1990) or Black and Lynch (2001).40
According to these approaches, we regress, in a first step, our outcome variable S
on N and other time varying input factors Xv available for the entire observation
period 2001 to 2008. Thereby, we also control for sectoral and cyclical fluctuations.
Our first-step regression equation can therefore be written as
Sit = αNit +X
v
itβ + µi + ξt + uit . (25)
From this equation we calculate the establishment-specific, time-invariant compo-
nent of the residual, i.e., µˆi. This establishment fixed effect measures whether an
individual Si structurally exceeds or falls below the wage bill-to-total sales ratio
of other establishments. In the second step, we regress µˆi|Ci = 1 on the remaining
39There even exist extreme cases where the top management of a firm bribes the members of
the works council to achieve cooperation. For example, in 2007 Volkswagen (VW) top manager
Peter Hartz was convicted of misappropriation since he had used 2.6 million euro of VW to
corrupt the VW works council.
40Similar to our research question, Hirsch (1990) investigates the rent-seeking effects of union
coverage, while Black and Lynch (2001) examine the productivity effects of innovative workplace
practices and information technology.
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(quasi-fixed) explanatory variables in X, i.e., Xf and the cooperation dummies
Cnc and Cc.
It is evident from equation (24) that our current regression approach is re-
stricted to establishments with a works council and thus excludes establishments
without a works council. Hence, apart from unobserved heterogeneity we must
also take the selectivity problem into account. We additionally control for a po-
tential selectivity bias by adding inverse Mill’s ratio calculated from a standard
cross-sectional endogenous switching regression model in analogy to (14), (15),
and (16) as a selectivity correction term to the set of explanatory variables.41 As
a whole, the second stage of our two-step regression approach can therefore be
expressed as
E(µi|Ci = 1) = Xfi β1 + λncCnci + λcCci + σε˜,1
φ(δNi + Ziγ)
Φ(δNi + Ziγ)
, (26)
where σε˜,1 = σε˜,u˜1 . φ(·) and Φ(·) represent the density and the distribution function
of the standard normal distribution, and φ(·)/Φ(·) is inverse Mill’s ratio (or normal
hazard function).42 λc > 0 and λc > λnc would support our view of S as a
measure for rent-seeking intensity. The corresponding parameter estimates (with
and without selectivity correction) are displayed in Table 2.43
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The estimates confirm our expectations, i.e., works councils maintaining a co-
operative relationship with the management tend to increase the establishment’s
wage bill-to-total sales ratio. λc is positive and significant relative to the reference
group, while λnc measuring the corresponding impact for non-cooperative works
councils is insignificant. Moreover, a Wald test confirms that λc > λnc. These re-
sults hold irrespective of selectivity correction. Note, however, that the coefficient
41Similar to the proceeding in Subsection 6.2 we use the establishment age and the exployment
expectations dummy variable as exclusion restrictions in the selection equation.
42For a similar procedure see Zwick (2005) who examines the productivity effects of continuous
training, as well as Zwick (2004) and Mueller (2009) who focus on the productivity effects of
employee participation or works councils in Germany.
43The first-stage estimates according to equation (25) are displayed in Table 4 in the appendix.
The estimates of the remaining second-stage control variables are available from the authors upon
request.
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for inverse Mill’s ratio σε˜,1 is insignificant which is consistent with the estimate of
ρε˜,1 in the previous subsection.
To sum up, when it is just the cooperative works councils that contribute to
increasing the workers’ share in establishment output, we can interpret this finding
in terms of rent seeking, i.e., cooperative works councils are likely to succeed in
redistributing rents from the employer to the workers. Hence, we can state that this
result is in line with our estimates in the previous subsection. As a consequence,
our interpretation of the wage bill-to-total sales ratio as an indicator for rent-
seeking activities and thus our conclusions in terms of the examined rent-seeking
effects gain additional support through the estimates in this subsection.
7 Conclusions
When analyzing establishment size and internal rent seeking, one might at first
sight suppose that the employer prefers a small establishment size to limit the
intensity of internal politicking by reducing the number of rent seekers (quantity
effect). However, the theoretical results have shown that a large establishment size
may be beneficial for the employer, if individual rent seekers are discouraged by
a large number of opponents (discouragement effect). Since the employer himself
engages in the contest, the discouragement effect would reduce his own rent-seeking
expenditures. In addition, the employer will not exclusively choose establishment
size in order to control rent-seeking behavior. Our model has revealed that the
smaller the degree of contract incompleteness, the more the employer will focus on
technological aspects when choosing the size of the workforce.
We have shown that the introduction of a works council leads to efficient es-
tablishment size in the theoretical model. A works council allows the workers to
coordinate individual behavior in the rent-seeking contest. In that case, the em-
ployer competes against a single collective player, leading to a disentangling of
rent-seeking and production issues. Consequently, the employer is only concerned
with production technology and implements efficient establishment size. However,
the employer does not necessarily benefit from a works council. He will only benefit
if restored production efficiency and a higher share in the rent outweigh his larger
35
rent-seeking expenditures caused by more aggressive behavior in the contest.
The last section offers an empirical analysis that tests the relevance of the
quantity and the discouragement effects as well as the role of works councils in
rent seeking. The econometric results point out that the discouragement effect
dominates the quantity effect in establishments without a works council. As the-
oretically predicted, works councils override both effects, so that the impact of
establishment size on rent-seeking intensity is no longer significant. This find-
ing is also intuitively plausible. When a works council is installed, the employer
can no longer use establishment size to influence the rent-seeking behavior of the
workforce. Instead, the employer will focus on production efficiency to maximize
profits. Higher profits increase the employer’s income both from production that
is protected by contracts and from the rent-seeking contest. Note that the ad-
vantage of disentangling rent-seeking and production issues is also applicable to
local unions in the United States or other countries since the theoretical argument
of our model does not depend on institutional details that are specific to works
councils. Even the employer may benefit from a works council or local union as
a single collective opponent in the rent-seeking contest, particularly if this oppo-
nent happens to be weak because of internal agency problems that prevent perfect
worker coordination.
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Appendix
Proof of Corollary 1:
In case of a power impact function (2) equilibrium expenditures a∗ are given by
a∗ = βN (1− α) pi (N) / (1 +N)2. Using A′ (·) = β, condition (7) boils down to
αpi′ (N∗) =
1− α
1 +N∗
[
pi (N∗)
1 +N∗
(
1− βN
∗ − 1
1 +N∗
)
− pi′ (N∗)
(
1− βN
∗
1 +N∗
)]
.
Note that both
(
1− βN−1
1+N
)
and
(
1− βN
(1+N)
)
are positive since β ∈ (0, 1). If
pi′ (N∗) on the right-hand side of the last equation were negative, we would have
a contradiction with the left-hand side. Therefore, we must have pi′ (N∗) > 0
implying N∗ < NFB.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Given a power impact function, optimal establishment size is described by
Ψ := αpi′ (N∗)− 1− α
1 +N∗
[(
pi (N∗)
1 +N∗
− pi′ (N∗)
)
−β
(
pi (N∗) (N∗ − 1)
(1 +N∗)2
− pi
′ (N∗)N∗
(1 +N∗)
)]
= 0.
Implicit differentiation gives
∂N∗
∂θ
=
αY ′ (N∗)− 1−α
1+N∗
[(
Y (N∗)
1+N∗ − Y ′ (N∗)
)
− β
(
Y (N∗)(N∗−1)
(1+N∗)2 −
Y ′(N∗)N∗
(1+N∗)
)]
−∂Ψ/∂N∗
(A1)
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since ∂pi (N) /∂θ = Y (N) and ∂pi′ (N) /∂θ = Y ′ (N). The denominator is positive
since, by assumption, the employer’s second-order condition at stage 2 of the game
is always satisfied. Note that
Y (N∗)
1 +N∗
− Y ′ (N∗) > Y (N
∗) (N∗ − 1)
(1 +N∗)2
− Y
′ (N∗)N∗
(1 +N∗)
⇔ 2
N + 1
Y (N∗) > Y ′ (N∗)
is always satisfied since 2
N+1
> 1
N
, and Y (N)
N
> Y ′ (N) must hold because Y (N)
is concave. Hence, we must differentiate between three possible constellations for
the numerator of (A1): (i) If both terms in parentheses, Y (N
∗)
1+N∗ − Y ′ (N∗) and
Y (N∗)(N∗−1)
(1+N∗)2 −
Y ′(N∗)N∗
(1+N∗) , are positive the whole expression in square brackets will
be positive as β ∈ (0, 1). If the first term in parentheses is positive and the
second one negative, again the expression in square brackets will be positive. If
both terms in parentheses are negative (i.e., Y (N
∗)
1+N∗ < Y
′ (N∗)), the expression
in square brackets will be negative if and only if β is smaller than the cut-off
β¯ :=
(
Y ′ (N∗)− Y (N∗)
1+N∗
)
/
(
Y ′(N∗)N∗
(1+N∗) − Y (N
∗)(N∗−1)
(1+N∗)2
)
.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The first-order condition
∂uE (N, a
∗
E)
∂N
=
[
1 + α
2
− A′
(
(1− α) pi (N)
4
)
(1− α)
4
]
pi′ (N) = 0
yields two sets of stationary points. The first set contains all N1 with
2(1+α)
1−α =
A′
(
(1−α)pi(N1)
4
)
, whereas the second one is a singleton consisting of N2 = N
FB with
pi′ (N2) = 0. Optimal establishment size must satisfy
∂2uE (N, a
∗
E)
∂N2
= −A′′
(
(1− α) pi (N)
4
)
(1− α)2 [pi′ (N)]2
16
+
[
2 (1 + α)
1− α − A
′
(
(1− α) pi (N)
4
)]
(1− α) pi′′ (N)
4
< 0
to describe a maximum. Obviously, ∂2uE (N, a
∗
E) /∂N
2|N=N1 > 0 since A′′ (·) < 0
due to the concavity of A (·). Since all N1 correspond to a minimum and uE (N, a∗E)
is continuous (when treating N as a continuous variable), N2 must describe a
maximum.
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Proof of Proposition 6:
Given (2), without works council, E optimally spends a∗ − ∆ = βN∗ (1− α)
pi (N∗) / (1 +N∗)2 −∆ in the contest (with N∗ < NFB according to Corollary 1).
When comparing a∗ − ∆ to a∗E = βγ∗β(1 − α)pi(NFB)/(1 + γ∗β)2 − ∆E we have
to take account of the facts that pi(NFB) > pi (N∗), and that γ∗β/(1 + γ∗β)2 >
N∗/ (1 +N∗)2 if and only if γ∗ is sufficiently large.
Recall that without works council E realizes utility
uE (N
∗) =
(
α + (1− α)1 + (1− β)N
∗
(N∗ + 1)2
)
pi(N∗) + ∆,
whereas with works council his utility amounts to uE
(
NFB; γ∗
)
. Since pi(NFB) >
pi (N∗), γ∗β < N∗ and the expression [1 + (1− β)x] / (x+ 1)2 is monotonically
decreasing in x, we immediately obtain uE
(
NFB; γ∗
)
> uE (N
∗) for ∆E = ∆.
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Table 1: Quantity effect vs. discouragement effect
Model Fixed effects model Endogenous switching regression model
(12), (13) (20), (21), (22) (20), (21), (23)
C = 0 C = 1 C = 0 C = 1 C = 0 C = 1
N −0.143∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.092∗∗ −0.000 −0.119∗∗ −0.002
(0.005) (0.896) (0.048) (0.966) (0.019) (0.852)
ρε˜,0 0.121
∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
[0.026] [0.027]
ρε˜,1 0.002 0.027
[0.033] [0.035]
χ2-test of independent equations 21.01∗∗∗ 25.13∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
χ2-test of α0 = α1 3.56
∗ 5.13∗∗
(0.059) (0.023)
χ2-test of irrelevant exclusion restrictions
166.18∗∗∗ 172.30∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
χ2-test of exogeneous exclusion restrictions
0.218 0.455
(0.640) (0.499)
χ2-test of insignificant controls for correlated fixed effects
320.13∗∗∗ 235.65∗∗∗ 299.00∗∗∗ 249.47∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
nobs 35,632 18,941 54,573 50,413
nest 12,401 6,709 18,229 17,348
Note: ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level. The estimated coefficients for N are
multiplied with 1,000. The values in ( ) represent p-values calculated on the basis of cluster-
robust standard errors that cluster on the individual establishment to correct for the potential
correlation of the error terms over time. The values in [ ] for ρε˜,0 and ρε˜,1 represent the respec-
tive standard errors. The χ2-test of exogeneous instruments is a (modified) Sargan test that
reports p-values calculated on the basis of conventional standard errors. nobs is sample size. nest
is the number of establishments. All model specifications additionally control for technological
innovations (technical state of the technologies in use, expansion investments per capita), the
structure of the workforce (skilled workers, female workers, fixed-term workers, part-time work-
ers, apprentices), export shares, and include dummy variables for collective wage setting, extra
payments beyond the wage bargaining level, foreign ownership, private companies, independent
firms, sector affiliation, location and time.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2001–2008, own calculations.
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Table 2: Effects of cooperative and non-cooperative works councils
Model Two-step approach, Two-step approach,
equation (26) without selectivity corrected,
selectivity correction equation (26)
Cnc −0.011 −0.011
(0.358) (0.373)
Cc 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005)
φ(·)/Φ(·) 0.021
(0.204)
F -test of λnc = λc 5.98
∗∗ 5.65∗∗
(0.014) (0.017)
χ2-test of irrelevant instruments 31.11∗∗∗
(0.000)
χ2-test of exogeneous instruments 2.288
(0.130)
n 1,907 1,907
Note: ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level. The values in parentheses represent
p-values calculated on the basis of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The χ2-test of
exogeneous instruments reports p-values calculated on the basis of conventional standard errors.
It works similar to the Sargan test, i.e., at first the residuals estimated from equation (26) are
regressed on the exclusion restrictions, the cooperation dummies and Xf . Then, the p-value of
the resulting test statistic n · R2 is calculated from the χ2-distribution. n is sample size. The
first-stage specification (see Table 4 in the appendix) controls for input factors (i.e., establishment
size, technological innovations and the structure of the workforce), sector affiliation and time.
The second-stage specification additionally includes export shares as well as dummy variables
for collective wage setting, extra payments beyond the wage bargaining level, foreign ownership,
private companies, independent firms, sector affiliation, establishment size and location.
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2001–2008, own calculations.
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Table 3: Definition of the variables and descriptive statistics
Variable Definition Mean Std.-dev. Min–Max
S = W/Y Wage bill-total sales ratio 0.287 0.184 0.001–1
N Number of employees 152.27 506.25 5–19,671
C Dummy variable indicating whether
or not an establishment has a works
council
0.347 0.476 0–1
Skilled work-
ers
Share of skilled workers on the basis
of total workforce (%)
68.59 25.54 0–100
Fixed-term
workers
Share of fixed-term workers on the
basis of total workforce (%)
5.04 12.04 0–100
Part-time
workers
Share of part-time workers on the
basis of total workforce (%)
17.95 22.83 0-100
Apprentices Share of apprentices on the basis of
total workforce (%)
5.62 9.12 0–100
Female
workers
Share of female workers on the basis
of total workforce (%)
38.09 28.91 0–100
Technical
status
Dummy variable calculated from an
ordinal variable TS ranging between
1 (technologies in use are out-of-
date) and 5 (technologies in use are
state-of-the-art); 1 if TS ≥ 4, 0 oth-
erwise
0.677 0.467 0–1
Expansion
investments
Natural logarithm of a firm’s expan-
sion investments per capita
2.92 7.70 -8.81–19.25
Export share Export share on the basis of total
sales (%)
8.07 18.71 0–100
Union Dummy variable indicating whether
or not an establishment commits to
collective wage bargaining at the in-
dustry or firm level
0.527 0.499 0–1
Extra pay Dummy variable indicating whether
or not an establishment pays wages
above the collective wage bargaining
level
0.256 0.436 0–100
Private com-
pany
Dummy variable indicating whether
or not an establishment is managed
under the legal form of a one-man
business or a business partnership
0.263 0.440 0–1
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Table 3: Definition of the variables and descriptive statistics; continued
Variable Definition Mean Std.-dev. Min–Max
Foreign own-
ership
Dummy variable indicating whether
or not an establishment has a non-
domestic owner
0.061 0.240 0–1
Independent
company
Dummy variable indicating whether
or not an establishment is autarkic
0.749 0.433 0–1
West Dummy variable indicating whether
or not an establishment is located in
West Germany
0.620 0.485 0–1
Establishment
age
Dummy variable indicating whether
or not an establishment has been
founded later than 1990
0.434 0.495 0–1
Employment
expectations
Dummy variable indicating whether
or not an establishment expects a
negative employment growth for the
next year
0.167 0.373 0–1
Cnc Dummy variable indicating estab-
lishments that have to do with non-
cooperative works councils typically
opposing management decisions
0.035 0.185 0–1
Cc Dummy variable indicating estab-
lishments that have to do with coop-
erative works councils typically sup-
porting management decisions
0.224 0.417 0–1
Note: Number of observations: 54,573 (1,907 for Cnc and Cc).
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2001–2008, own calculations.
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Table 4: Control variables and first-stage regression estimates
Variable Equation Equation Selection First-stage
(20) (21) equation estimates,
C = 0 C = 1 (22) equation (25)
N 0.612∗∗∗ −0.010
Skilled workers 0.185∗∗∗ 0.107 0.231 0.154∗∗∗
Fixed-term workers 0.494∗∗∗ 0.344 −0.931 0.458∗∗∗
Part-time workers −0.086 0.033 −0.010 −0.087
Apprentices −0.504∗∗∗ −0.023 0.576 −0.472∗∗∗
Female workers 0.034 −0.074 0.254 0.010
Technical status 1.250 −1.014 −2.831 0.519
Expansion investments 0.175 −0.183 −0.489 0.034
Export share −0.214∗ −0.190∗∗ 0.648
Union 2.548 −1.230 93.506∗∗∗
Extra pay 1.439 1.954 −19.708
Private company −6.816 −10.016∗ −8.721
Foreign ownership −0.429 5.427 64.766
Independent company 0.177 −0.249 −2.330
West −2.004 23.236∗∗ 22.518
Establishment age
(within mean) −0.317∗∗∗
Employment expectations
(within mean) 0.533∗∗∗
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Within means yes yes yes no
Constant 0.198∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ −0.712∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
Note: ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denotes significance at the 10/5/1 % level. Standard errors are omitted in order
to save space. All coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. This holds except for the constant terms
and the instruments. Sample size is 54,573. The number of establishments is 18,229
Source: IAB Establishment Panel 2001–2008, own calculations.
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